Serfs, Soldiers, Citizens: Military Effectiveness and the Social Contract evaluates the democratic advantage theory of military effectiveness and advances a counterargument that military effectiveness is more closely related to patterns of wealth redistribution and social mobility. While these phenomena are often seen as inherent to democracies, in practice autocratic states can display those qualities, too. Additionally, both democracies and autocracies tend to change policies toward improving military effectiveness following wars that went poorly for them, and that shift does not always entail a move towards greater democracy. There are many instances of a country, following a defeat, adopting better policies on social mobility and wealth redistribution and yet become more autocratic, then displaying superior effectiveness in conflict in comparison with an earlier war. Autocratic states have an advantage of more rapid preparation for a war they anticipate, while democracies are better at improving their policies toward greater military effectiveness once engaged in a war.
Author Biography
Dr. Michael P. Jasinski, associate professor of political science is the author of two other books, Social Trust, Anarchy, and International Conflict and Examining Genocides: Means, Motive, and Opportunity. Joshua Grunske completed his B.A. in Political Science at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh and later earned an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Rhode Island.
